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Criminal Law and Procedure 
by Rex A. Collings, lr.* 
I should see the garden far better 
if I could get to the top of that hill: and 
here's a path that leads straight to it 
But how curiously it twists! It's more like a 
corkscrew than a path! 
When one commences with a Lewis Carroll quotation, l it 
is customary to depart with a Cheshire grin. I propose to 
* A.B. 1935, M.A. 1948, J.D. 1951, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Member, California 
State Bar. 
The author extends his appreciation 
for assistance in the preparation of this 
article to Robert E. Gyemant and Henry 
W. Holmes, students at the School of 
Law, University of California, Berke-
ley; and to Joan Bradford, David Roche 
and Alan Sommers, students at Golden 
Gate College, School of Law. 
1. Cf. Dalbey, Alice Would Have 
Questions Traveling in a Police Patrol 
Car, 1 J.Cal.L.Enf. 139 (1967). The 
author suggests that if Lewis Carroll 
were writing about Alice today, he 
would put her in a patrol car instead 
of sending her down a rabbit hole. This 
way he could arrange for her to dis-
cover a topsy-turvy world more simply. 
Unfortunately, Alice in Wonderland 
was a dream. The patrol car is real. 
Take a ride with a patrol officer and 
see the topsy-turvy world, suggests Mr. 
Dalbey. 
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do otherwise. I propose to needle the California Supreme 
Court. It needs needling. Or is it a Holy of Holies that 
cannot stand having its veil rent in twain? 
When I agreed to discuss the work of the courts during the 
period of October 1, 1966 to September 30, 1967, I did not 
realize the magnitude of the task. During that period there 
were 100 (my research assistant says 99) California Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with criminal law and procedure. 
During the same period there were only 91 noncriminal 
decisions. The proportions of courts of appeal decisions are 
comparable. Of the 100 California Supreme Court cases, 
26 were death-penalty cases with automatic appeal under 
Penal Code section 1239 (b). 
It is frustrating to be faced with so many decisions. In the 
first place, one must neglect federal cases, particularly Su-
preme Court decisions binding the California courts. In the 
second place, one must give rather inadequate treatment even 
to the California Supreme Court decisions.s Finally, there is 
almost no time to devote to decisions in courts of appeal, 
although many of these decisions have important implications. 
Accordingly, the present treatment must of necessity be some-
what limited in scope. 
Probably the single most important development of the 
year came from the Joint Committee for the Revision of the 
Penal Code.s That committee, through its project director, 
Professor Arthur H. Sherry of the University of California, 
Berkeley, published its Tentative Draft No.1. The draft 
deals with general principles of liability, defenses, kidnapping 
and related crimes, sex crimes and arson. Other drafts are 
expected in the near future. It is hoped that the ultimate 
result will be a modernization of the Penal Code of 1872, 
2. For an excellent and thorough 
discussion of a few decisions, see Com-
ment, The Supreme Court of California 
1966-1967, 55 CAL.L.REV. 1059, 1123 
(1967). 
3. The background of the Joint Com-
mittee and the procedure being followed 
are outlined in its 1967 report to the 
368 CAL LAW 1967 
Governor and legislature. Copies of 
Tentative Draft No. 1 may be procured 
from the Project office, Joint Com-
mittee for the Revision of the Penal 
Code, School of Law, Boalt Hall, 
University of California, Berkeley. The 
Joint Committee and Project Director 
will be delighted to receive comments. 
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which is badly in need of clarification and revision. Since 
1872, there has never been a continuing and coordinated 
effort to develop a coherent and comprehensive code. 
Tentative Draft No. 1 consists of basic provisions which 
are largely uncontroversial. It should be read with Tentative 
Draft No.2, which will include the basic sentencing provisions. 
The only proposal in the draft which may be controversial is 
the treatment of deviate sexual relations between consenting 
adults as noncriminal. Currently, a normal sexual relation-
ship between consenting adults is deemed noncriminal, unless 
the relationship ripens into a pretended marriage. 4 "Statu-
tory rape" would be somewhat narrowed under the proposal. 
It would not be an offense unless the defendant is at least 
three years older than the "victim."5 
Another important development is the new Journal of Cali-
fornia Law Enforcement. The Journal, now in its second 
year, is published by the California Peace Officers' Associa-
tion for its members, and contains articles on such problems 
:lS "black power," advising minors of their rights, the rights of 
drrested persons in general, some technical articles, as well 
as articles designed to improve police administration. Each 
issue includes a discussion of recent decisions. One issue 
contains a useful summary of 1967 legislation affecting crim-
inallaw. The editors should be complimented for a fine job. 
It is hoped that the journal is being distributed to judges, 
particularly those in the appellate courts who sometimes seem 
unaware of police problems. 
I. Criminal Procedure 
A. Pretrial Procedures 
Arrest, Search and SeizureS 
In 1967 the legislature established detailed provisions in 
Penal Code section 1538.5 for pretrial hearings to determine 
whether questioned items of evidence are a product of an 
4. Cal. Penal Code § 269a. 
5. The draft does not consider young 
males who are victimized by females. 
24 
6. For an interesting note see Stop 
and Frisk in California, 18 Hastings 
L.J. 623 (1967). 
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unreasonable search and seizure. The defendant Can move 
to return property or suppress evidence. The right to move 
for return or suppression at the trial is restricted to cases 
where prior opportunity to make the motion did not exist or 
where the defendant was unaware of the grounds. The pros-
ecutor can seek review by a writ of mandate or prohibition 
if the motion is granted. The defendant may include denial 
of his motion as a ground for appeal upon conviction. The 
new statute will provide an orderly and efficient procedure 
for testing illegality of a search and seizure. 
The problem of disclosure of the names of informers in 
narcotics cases has been very troublesome. Informers must 
be used if the law is to be enforced. If their names are dis-
closed they may be dead-perhaps physicially or at least 
as informers. In 1958, in Priestly v. Superior Court,7 the 
California Supreme Court held that if communications 
from an informer are relied upon to show reasonable cause 
to make an arrest and a search incidental thereto, the identity 
of the informer must be disclosed at the defendant's request 
or testimony as to his communications must be stricken. In 
1965 the legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 
1881.1 8 to allow nondisclosure in narcotics prosecutions if 
the magistrate or trial judge is satisfied after a hearing that 
the informer is reliable. The court, in a per curiam decision 
in Martin v. Superior Court,9 followed McCray v. Illinois1o 
and held that section 1881.1 is constitutional. Perhaps 
Martin should be extended to types of criminal activity other 
than narcotics arrests. 
It has been held that a peace officer's powers to arrest 
beyond his territorial jurisdiction are identical with those of 
any citizen.ll His powers to search after such an arrest are 
also those of a private citizen, namely, to search for offensive 
weapons.12 However, the California Supreme Court recently 
7. 50 Cal.2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). 10. 386 u.s. 300, 18 L. Ed.2d 62, 87 
8. Former Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § S. Ct. 1056 (1967). 
1881.1 is now Cal. Evid. Code § 1042. 11. People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App. 
9. 66 Cal.2d 257, 57 Cal. Rptr. 351, 2d 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964). 
424 P.2d 935 (1967). 12. Cal. Penal Code § 846; see also 
370 CAL LAW 1967 
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recognized that the doctrine of "fresh pursuit,,13 is not limited 
by the historical application of "freshness." Furthermore, 
the court seems ready to approve the 1965 amendment to 
Penal Code section 817, which seems to be an endeavor to 
overrule earlier decisions, and which extends the authority 
of a peace officer "to any place in the state . . . as to a 
public offense . . . [committed or] which there is probable 
cause to believe has been committed within the political sub-
division that employs him.,,14 
The problem of impounded cars has also been troublesome. 
When an arrest is made in or around a motor vehicle under 
circumstances that require taking the defendant to the police 
station, the peace officers obviously cannot leave the car 
on the street; they therefore impound it. This means that 
it must be towed, either by their own tow car in a large juris-
diction, or by a contractor. The contents of the car have to 
be inventoried, lest questions arise as to whether someone has 
stolen some of its contents. Thus, if highway patrol officers 
make an arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquors, the defendant must be taken to jail. While awaiting 
the tow truck, one officer makes out the "drunk" report, while 
the other inventories the contents of the vehicle and tries 
to get the defendant to sign the inventory. 
Judicial decisions have tended to limit the right to search 
impounded vehicles. For example, in Preston v. United 
States,15 the defendants were arrested for vagrancy. One offi-
cer drove the car to the station and had it towed to a garage. 
After the defendants were booked, the glove compartment 
and trunk were searched without a search warrant. Articles 
were found which were used to convict the defendants on a 
charge of conspiracy to rob a bank. The convictions were 
reversed on the ground that the search was too remote in 
time and place to have been incidental to the arrest. 
People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App.2d 91, 
36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964). 
13. People v. Sandoval, 65 Cal.2d 
303, 54 Cal. Rptr. 123, 419 P.2d 187 
(1966). 
14. 65 Ca1.2d at 3l3, n. 10, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 129, 419 P.2d at 193. 
15. 376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed.2d 777, 
84 S. Ct. 881 (1964). 
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In People v. Burke/6 the California Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar problem. The defendant was arrested 
early in the morning on suspicion of burglary, apparently with 
reasonable cause. The officers could not open the trunk of 
the car with the keys provided, and towed the car to the 
impound lot. The car was not searched until 3: 00 p.m. In 
the trunk were found articles taken in a burglary shortly 
before the arrest, which were later used in evidence. The 
court held that the search was too remote in time and place 
and the evidence obtained as a result was improperly admitted. 
However, in Cooper v. California17 a result prevailed which 
seems to be inconsistent with Preston and Burke. In that 
case the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, upheld a California court. Section 11611 of the Health 
and Safety Code provides that any officer making an arrest 
for a narcotics violation must seize the vehicle and turn it 
over to the Division of Narcotics "to be held as evidence" 
until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered. In 
Cooper the officers had reasonable cause to make the arrest. 
They then seized the car. A week later, a search was made 
of the impounded car without a warrant, and some of the 
fruits of that search were admitted in evidence at Cooper's 
trial for selling heroin. The court, quoting United States v. 
Rabinowitz/8 stated that "[t]he relevant test is not whether 
it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the 
search was reasonable.,,19 In Cooper the court found a "rea-
sonable" search even though the search had been made a week 
after the arrest. 
This year the California Supreme Court also decided 
People v. Webb. 20 In Webb, the defendant was lawfully 
arrested, pursuant to an outstanding warrant, on a summer 
night in an Oakland area largely inhabited by Negroes. He 
tried to escape and shots were fired which resulted in a collision 
16. 61 Cal.2d 575, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531, 19. 339 U.S. at 65, 94 L. Ed. at 660, 
394 P.2d 67 (1964). 70 S. Ct. at 435 (1950). 
17. 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed.2d 730, 20. 66 Cal.2d 107, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
87 S. Ct. 788 (1967). 902, 424 P.2d 342 (1967). 
18. 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. Ed. 653, 70 
S. Ct. 430 (1950). 
372 CAL LAW 1967 
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between the defendant's car and a parked car. The defendant 
was wounded. In the interval before the arrival of an ambu-
lance, a red balloon was observed on the floor in the front 
seat of the car. A crowd gathered and it was decided that 
the car should not be further searched at the scene. It was 
towed to a police parking lot and searched when the arresting 
officer, who had accompanied the defendant to the hospital, 
had an opportunity to make the search. Other balloons were 
found, all of which contained heroin. (The facts do not show 
whether there were more red balloons; at least one was 
orange.) Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, upheld the 
search. He distinguished Preston and Burke, and swept 
Cooper under the rug. However, he wrote what to law pro-
fessors will be a very useful opinion discussing numerous 
decisions. [A number of the Mosk decisions of the past year 
are going to find their way into my criminal procedure course-
book. They are sound opinions, whether you agree with 
them or not.] Justice Peters concurred, in a brief opinion, 
but thought that the search was proper under Cooper and 
that Cooper overruled Preston. Although I agree with the 
result in Webb, I have some difficulty in understanding why 
the California courts should be bound by Cooper even if it 
did overrule Preston, as suggested by Justice Peters. Can we 
not, under our state Constitution, have more restrictive rules 
than those proclaimed by the United States Supreme Court 
under the Fourteenth Amendment? 
There were several other arrest, search and seizure deci-
sions which are worthy of brief mention. Evidence resulting 
from illegal searches and seizures by private persons continues 
to be admissible. Thus, in People v. Botts,l a service station 
attendant observed narcotics activity through a hole in the 
wall of a restroom and reported his observations to peace 
officers. This led to arrest and conviction of the defendant 
for possession of heroin. The court distinguished cases in-
volving such searches by peace officers2 or their agents,3 and 
affirmed the conviction. Its ground seemingly was that a 
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2. See, e.g., Bielicki v. Superior 
412 (1967). Court, 57 Cal.2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 
552, 371 P.2d 288 (1962). 
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private citizen cannot be assumed to be aware of the exclu-
sionary rule. It did recognize, however, that "It may well 
be that the bathroom is becoming the last sanctuary of privacy 
in an increasingly Orwellian society.,,4 
It is also legal to search a baby's diaper and seize heroin, 
provided, of course, that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that a crime is being committed on the premises.5 Apparently 
under such circumstances a baby wearing a diaper is the 
equivalent of a house, a garage, or a car. Incidentally, the 
baby was not arrested for possession of heroin. 
The right of Alcoholic Beverage Control officers to search 
a bar without a warrant under applicable statutes6 was upheld 
in People v. Lisner.7 The court felt that the guarantee against 
unreasonable search and seizure is less limited in searches 
of bars than in searches of "businesses standing higher in the 
public esteem"g or dwellings. There was no discussion of 
probable cause (receiving stolen property), although it ap-
peared to be present. 
In People v. Williams,9 the court upheld a search under 
what appears to be a rather novel fact situation. Officers 
approached a store at 5: 30 a.m. to investigate a ringing 
burglar alarm. At a point a block and a half from the store, 
the officers observed the headlights of an approaching auto-
mobile. There were no other moving cars on the street. The 
officers made a U-turn and followed the suspect vehicle, which 
made a number of turns in the course of a few blocks. The 
officers then activated the red light and siren and followed 
at high speed. The defendant ultimately got out of the car 
and fled on foot. The key remained in the ignition. When 
the officers reached the auto they opened the trunk and ob-
served a stack of men's suits on hangers. They arrested the 
3. See, e.g., People v. Tarantino, 45 6. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 25753, 
Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955). 25755. 
4. 250 Cal. App.2d at 483, 58 Cal. 7. 249 Cal. App.2d 637, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 416. Rptr. 674 (1967). 
5. People v. Garavito, 65 Cal.2d 761, 8. 249 Cal. App.2d at 641, 57 Cal. 
56 Cal. Rptr. 289, 423 P.2d 217 (1967). Rptr. at 677 (1967). 
The court found other grounds for re- 9. 67 Ca1.2d 167, 60 Cal. Rptr. 472, 
versal by a 4-to-3 decision. 430 P.2d 30 (1967). 
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defendant in a vacant building a block away, and towed the 
car to a police storage garage where its contents were inven-
toried without a warrant. In addition to 29 suits previously 
observed, the trunk contained burglary tools. The court 
upheld both searches as incident to the arrest and as anal-
ogous to the situation in Webb. 
In People v. Hohensee,lo the court considered the surrepti-
tious recording of a public lecture. The defendant held 
lectures in a rented hotel conference room. He represented 
that Mercurochrome causes cancer, that the white of an egg 
cures burns without scarring, that the American Medical 
Association is the American Murder Association, and that 
Salk and Sabin vaccines cause more polio than they cure, 
and represented that his "Elixir of the Gods" (honey) would 
eliminate arthritis. The modus operandi was to hold lectures 
representing that the "elixir" could cure diseases, to give it 
away, and then to collect substantial sums of money as dona-
tions from the gullible audience. A food and drug inspector 
entered a 10ft above the meeting room with permission of 
the hotel, and placed a microphone three feet from the loud-
speaker in the ceiling to record the lectures. 
Distinguishing Silverman v. United States/1 the court held 
that placing a microphone three feet from the loudspeaker 
was not an unauthorized physical intrusion into a private 
area. The officer did not spy on the defendant through holes 
bored or other openings made for spying into a private area. 
The lectures were public. Therefore hearing what the audi-
ence heard was not a search. 
In Flack v. Municipal Court,12 there was a seizure of an 
allegedly lewd film without a warrant. Petitioner Flack was 
the owner of a theatre showing the film "Sexus," which had 
been showing for two weeks. Local officers viewed the film 
and believed it to be obscene. They arrested petitioner and 
at the same time seized the film. The court noted that the 
10. 251 Cal. App.2d 193, 59 Cal. 12. 66 Cal.2d 981, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 234 (1967). 872, 429 P.2d 192 (1967). 
11. 365 U.S. 505, 5 L. Ed.2d 734, 
81 S. Ct. 679. 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 (1961). 
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film had been showing for two weeks and, even if the search 
had been contemporaneous with the arrest, a search warrant 
should have been secured prior to any search or seizure of the 
material. It distinguished this set of facts from the situation 
where there is a high probability of the evidence being lost, 
destroyed, or spirited away. The court issued a writ of man-
date compelling the return of the film. Justice McComb 
dissented.13 
In People v. Mills,14 a search warrant was properly sought. 
In issuing the warrant, the magistrate used a mimeographed 
form which adopts for Los Angeles County the form of war-
rant prescribed by Penal Code section 1529. This form 
commands that the search be made "in the daytime (at any 
time of the day or night, good cause being shown therefor)." 
The court felt that, pursuant to Penal Code section 1533, the 
failure of the magistrate to strike out the phrase "in the day-
time" invalidated a nighttime search. It appears that Penal 
Code section 1533 expressly requires an affirmative act on 
the part of the magistrate if night search is to be authorized.15 
In a shocking decision, the California Supreme Court 
reversed a death penalty following a conviction in a brutal 
murder case, in People v. Spencer.16 The defendant made 
an extrajudicial confession uncoerced by pre-Escobedo stand-
ards. He confirmed his confession at trial, but claimed that 
the killing was unintentional. Since it was a robbery-murder, 
this was, of course, irrelevant. His codefendant testified 
that the defendant had told him of his intention to kill. The 
surviving witness testified to the facts. The court applied the 
13. In his dissent, Justice McComb 
incorporated by reference the lower 
court opinion in 56 Cal. Rptr. 162 
(1967), which seems to make more 
sense. There is nothing in the facts 
to suggest that this was more than a 
seizure incident to a search without a 
warrant, or that the officers had time 
to obtain a warrant. 
14. 251 Cal. App. 2d 420, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 489 (1967). 
376 CAL LAW 1967 
15. Cal. Penal Code § 1533. Inser-
tion of direction to serve warrant at 
any time of day or night. 
On a showing of good cause therefor, 
the magistrate may, in his discretion, 
insert a direction in the warrant that it 
may be served at any time of the day 
or night; in the absence of such a 
direction, the warrant may be served 
only in the daytime. 
16. 66 Ca1.2d 158, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163, 
424 P.2d 715 (1967). 
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principles established by Escobedo v. Illinoisl7 and People v. 
Dorado,I8 to conclude that the trial court had committed 
reversible error in admitting the defendant's confession in 
evidence. The court stated: 
Under the circumstances . . . we cannot realistically 
ignore the possibility that defendant's extrajudicial con-
fession might have impelled his subsequent confession 
in court. . . . In this sense, a later confession may 
always be viewed in part as fruit of the first.l9 
The court felt that its rule of reversible error per se compelled 
reversal of the conviction. Since the trial was pre-Escobedo, 
the defendant could not have known that the confession 
should have been excluded. Had he known this, he might 
have taken the stand to explain it or emphasize extenuating 
circumstances. The pre-Escobedo defendant must be given 
all the advantages of Escobedo. 
What is custody under Escobedo and Miranda?20 Early 
in 1963, the court stated that "Arrest is not essential to the 
maturing of the accusatory stage." In People v. Kelley,l 
Kelley, a serviceman, was interrogated by an officer of the 
San Diego Police Department at the San Diego Naval Station 
regarding his wife's allegation that he had sexually molested 
his eight-year-old step-son, in violation of sections 288 and 
288a of the California Penal Code. The police officer had 
informed Kelley of his rights, including his right to counsel. 
At the conclusion of this interrogation, Kelley was told to 
"hang around." Kelley was later interrogated by an employee 
of the San Diego Naval Station. He was again informed of 
his rights, except that nothing was said of his right to counsel. 
The poor Navy investigator should have known about Esco-
bedo (which was not to be decided until six months after 
the interview). At a pretrial hearing the Navy investigator 
17. 378 U.s. 478, 12 L. Ed.2d 977, 20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964). 436, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 
18. 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). 
398 P.2d 361 (1965). 1. 66 Ca1.2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 
19. 66 Cal.2d at 167, 57 Cal. Rptr. 424 P.2d 947 (1967). 
at 170, 424 P.2d at 722 (1967). 
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testified that Kelley had been free to leave, although he had 
not informed him that he was free to leave. Justice Peters, 
writing for the majority, declared: 
The existence of custody as an element of the accusatory 
stage does not depend on the subjective intent of the 
interrogator . . . [Rather it depends] upon whether 
defendant is placed in a situation in which he reasonably 
believes that his freedom of movement is restricted by 
pressures of official authority.2 
The court has for some time used the vague expression "cus-
tody" rather than "arrest." This court stated: "The rule is 
that a confession is inadmissible when at the time it is obtained 
. . . the suspect is in custody."a Peace officers have been 
puzzled about the difference between arrest and custody. Now 
they know. Or do they? 
Again, in People v. Arnold/ the court held that custody 
occurs when the "suspect is physically deprived of his freedom 
. . . in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reason-
able person, that he is so deprived."5 The defendant was 
notified by a deputy district attorney to come to his office to 
discuss the death of her child. Because of her religious beliefs, 
the defendant had not obtained medical assistance for her 
daughter during the child's terminal illness. Instead, mem-
bers of defendant's church had immersed the child in the 
river several hours before her death. The autopsy showed 
a wad of human hair, 2-1/2 inches long, jammed into the 
small intestine as the cause of death, with another larger hair 
ball lodged in the stomach for a period of several months. 
The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that such 
obstructions would cause fever, pain, weakness, vomiting and 
other indications of serious illness, and that an operation 
performed up to twelve hours before the daughter's death 
probably would have saved her life. 
2. 66 Cal.2d at 246, 57 Cal. Rptr. 4. 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 
at 375, 424 P.2d at 959 (1967). 426 P.2d 515 (1967). 
3. 66 Cal.2d at 245, 57 Cal. Rptr. 5. 66 Cal.2d at 448, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
at 374, 424 P.2d at 958 (1967). at 121, 426 P.2d at 521 (1967). 
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The defendant testified that she did not know that she 
did not have to comply with the district attorney's request 
to visit his office. She made a damaging statement which was 
admitted into evidence. The court, relying upon Kelley, 
reversed, holding that this was "custody"; the accusatory stage 
had been reached. Therefore the defendant was entitled to 
advice of her rights under Escobedo and Dorado. She reason-
ably could have believed that she could not leave the inter-
rogation chamber. Again the court spoke of "custody" by 
a circularity of definition. Three justices dissented in an 
opinion by Justice Mosk. He felt that the defendant had not 
been in custody; she had come by invitation. The deputy 
district attorney had made it clear that he was only investi-
gating. Indeed, interviews of this type are a familiar and 
reasonable aspect of preliminary law enforcement investi-
gations into unusual occurrences and have no such sinister 
significance as the majority attribute to them. The defendant 
could have left at any time, and did leave after the interview 
without being arrested. She was not charged with the crime 
until forty days after the interview. The minority would have 
rejected the subjective test for determining whether defendant 
had been in custody, stating that such a subjective concept 
excluded statements not because she had been in custody 
but because she later testified she had thought she was in cus-
tody. Approval of this mere declaration of her thought 
process is a giant departure from all accepted concepts of 
police restraint. Although the minority takes the preferable 
approach, the decision should caution busy young deputy 
district attorneys who perhaps sometimes abruptly summon 
possible suspects for interviews. They should make it quite 
clear that compliance with such summons is voluntary. And 
what of the citation procedures used by many district attor-
neys?6 Such hearings undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. 
However, they should be carefully hedged with procedural 
safeguards. Some of the forms now in use could certainly 
cause some persons to think that compliance is compulsory. 
6. See Hederman and Dahlinger, 
Citation Hearing System, 12 HASTINGS 
L.J.275 (1961). 
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Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, delivered 
a surprising decision in People v. Varnum, 7 upholding the 
right of the police to interrogate a suspect without warning 
him of his constitutional rights as long as no physical or 
psychological coercion is used and the testimony is not used 
in court against the defendant interrogated, even if the evi-
dence elicited by such interrogation is used against a codefend-
ant. The alleged murder weapon, a gun, was introduced at 
the trial as a most important piece of evidence for the prose-
cution. The gun had been discovered by the police as a 
direct result of the improper interrogation of a codefendant. 
The majority opinion frankly admitted that the interrogation 
of the codefendant was at the accusatory stage, but reasoned 
that the defendant, Varnum, had no standing to object. The 
court stated that: 
Non-coercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, how-
ever, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights pro-
tected by Escobedo, Dorado, and Miranda are violated 
only when evidence obtained without the required warn-
ings and waiver is introduced against the person whose 
questioning produced the evidence. Accord-
ingly, in the absence of such coercive tactics, there is 
no basis for excluding physical or other nonhearsay 
evidence acquired as a result of questioning a suspect 
in disregard of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
when such evidence is offered at the trial of another 
person.s 
The court did not use the term "fruits of the poisonous tree," 
or discuss People v. Ditson,9 where it assumed that the fruits 
of a codefendant's confession could not be used against the 
other defendant. 
Justice Peters wrote a strong dissent emphasizing the crystal-
clear mandate of Escobedo and Miranda, making it unlawful 
7. 66 Cal.2d 808, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 9. 57 CaI.2d 415, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 
427 P.2d 772 (1967). 369 P.2d 714 (1962); vacated, 371 U.S. 
8. 66 Cal. 2d at 812-813, 59 Cal. 541, 9 L. Ed.2d 508, 83 S.Ct. 519 
Rptr. at 111-112, 427 P.2d at 775 (1962). 
(1967). 
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to interrogate without giving the required warnings. "Insofar 
as we permit the fruits of an interrogation in violation of 
those cases to be introduced into evidence we are encouraging 
not deterring unlawful police activity.mo 
People v. Gonzalesll also involved the admissibility of a 
codefendant's extrajudicial statements, but is distinguished 
from Varnum inasmuch as the extrajudicial statements in 
Gonzales were used in a joint trial. The California Supreme 
Court reversed, basing its decision on People v. Aranda/2 
even though the trial judge carefully instructed the jury as to 
the limited effect of the statements. The court, relying on 
People v. Charles/3 applied Aranda retroactively. The 
Aranda rule is available to defendants whose judgments of 
conviction are still on appeal, even though they were tried 
before the date of the Aranda decision, November 12, 1965. 
In People v. Hines,14 the court, for a change, reached a 
realistic result on a confession problem. This case involved 
a "walk-in" confession of a robbery-murder, in which the 
defendant had walked into the Venice police substation, sur-
rendered the murder gun and ammunition, and confessed to 
the police. He was questioned for 55 minutes, with the 
conversation being tape recorded. However, the court felt 
that the questioning was necessary, since there was a possi-
bility that he was mentally disturbed or a fraud, reminiscent 
of the "Black Dahlia" case where the "walk-in" confessions 
ran to several hundred. Justice Peters dissented at some 
length, reasoning that at some point during the 55-minute 
period of questioning the stage ceases to be "investigatory" 
and becomes "accusatory." 
Right to Counsers 
There were a number of important right-to-counsel de-
cisions. Perhaps the most important was People v. Car-
10. 66 Cal.2d at 819, 59 Cal. Rptr. 13. 66 Cal.2d 330, 57 Cal. Rptr. 745, 
at 115-116,427 P.2d at 779-780 (1967). 425 P.2d 545 (1967). 
11. 66 Cal.2d 482, 58 Cal. Rptr. 14. 66 Cal.2d 348, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
361, 426 P.2d 929 (1967). 757, 425 P.2d 557 (1967). 
12. 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 15. See an interesting article, Graham, 
407 P.2d 265 (1965), discussed infra What is Custodial Interrogation?: Cali-
under Retroactivity. fomia's Anticipatory Application of 
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ter.16 Can a defendant conditionally waive his right to counsel 
and, when his condition is refused, obtain a reversal? The 
California Supreme Court answered this question in the affirm-
ative. The defendant's condition was use of the law library. 
The court felt that, at least under the facts shown, a defend-
ant who wishes to represent himself should be allowed as a 
minimum to avail himself of the legal materials available 
where he is confined. It noted that, in many cases, the 
minimum may be insufficient. Hopefully, the court will not 
create a constitutional right to visit the law library. Letting 
prisoners use the law library poses serious escape problems. 
It is expensive to provide guards. The right to counsel may 
include some right of a prisoner to use some of the facilities 
of the law library-in his cell. It should not include the right 
to go to the library. If a prisoner wants to do that he should 
be permitted to do it-through his counsel. 
Penal Code section 3042 provides that at least thirty days 
before a meeting to consider a granting of a parole, the Adult 
Authority shall send written notice to the Director of Correc-
tions, to the person requesting parole, and to the attorney for 
that person. But this requirement is held to be a general 
notice statute which does not evince an intent of the legislature 
to require the appointment of counsel at public expense for 
all indigent prisoners scheduled for parole consideration. The 
California Supreme Court, in In re Schoengarth,17 denied that 
a prisoner seeking a parole and the fixing of his indeterminate 
sentence has a right to counsel. This, it said, is an administra-
tive proceeding, and there is no right to counsel in such a 
proceeding. 
In re Smiley18 points to the importance of carefully main-
taining an adequate docket showing advice of right to coun-
Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLAL.Rev. 
59 (1966). 
16. 66 Cal.2d 666, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
614, 427 P.2d 214 (1967). 
17. 66 Cal.2d 295, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
600, 425 P.2d 200 (1967). See also 
In re Allison, 66 Cal.2d 282, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 (1967) con-
382 CAL LAW 1967 
cerning the problem of adequate com-
munication by a prisoner with his 
counsel and use of law books by a 
prisoner. These two decisions by Jus-
tice Mosk contain very useful discus-
sions of the problems involved. 
18. 66 Ca1.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
579, 427 P.2d 179 (1967). 
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sel, even in misdemeanor cases. It is not enough to show 
that the defendant was "duly arraigned." The clerk must 
go through the rigmarole of showing advice as to right to 
counsel, the right to court~appointed counsel if defendant is 
indigent, and the fact that there was a knowing and intelli-
gently expressed waiver. The docket entries must be pre-
pared for the particular case before the court; that require-
ment will not be satisfied by the use of forms. This decision 
points for the need of removing many types of offenses from 
the misdemeanor category and denominating them civil of-
fenses or violations. Hopefully, the right to counsel as well 
as the right to trial by jury could be removed in such instances. 
The right to be informed of the right to assistance of counsel 
under Escobedo is not unlimited. Thus, in People v. Argu-
ello/9 the defendant, in a gruesome murder, used a hammer 
which he tied to his 82-year-old victim's neck by a cord, using 
an unusual knot. A district attorney's investigator requested 
an officer at the jail to have defendant tie a bunch of clothing. 
In doing so defendant used the same type of knot as was used 
to tie the hammer to the victim's neck. Evidence of this was 
used at the trial. The jail officer had failed to inform defend-
ant of his right to an attorney and to remain silent before 
letting him tie the knot. The court rejected defendant's con-
tention that his rights had been violated, reasoning that decep-
tion alone does not render incriminating statements inadmis-
sible if it was not of a type reasonably likely to procure an 
untrue statement. Similarly, the deception employed in get-
ting the defendant to tie the knot did not render the evidence 
inadmissible. The moral of the story is that usually, but not 
always, the inhabitants of death row can tie the court in knots. 
Seemingly, a confession made to a nurse is admissible even 
without a warning as to constitutional rights, at least if "made 
voluntarily, without any questioning. . no police offi-
cers [being] present."20 Small wonder that the public loses 
its respect for the courts when something so obvious has to 
19. 65 Cal.2d 768, 56 Cal. Rptr. 20. People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal.2d at 
274, 423 P.2d 202 (1967). 870, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 638, 423 P.2d at 
790 (1967). 
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be expressed in a judicial decision. Perhaps the result would 
have been different had the events taken place in a county 
hospital. 
Apparently, admissions blurted out when the suspect is 
surprised while sitting on a toilet are admissible, despite lack 
of Miranda warnings. It was so held in People v. TahP 
In People v. Lara,2 it was contended that the Dorado warn-
ings are insufficient in a case involving minors, and that the 
waiver must be consented to either by an attorney or a parent. 
The court, over vigorous dissent by Justice Peters, rejected 
this contention, stating that whether a minor knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights is a question of fact. The court 
said, "mere failure of the authorities to seek the additional 
consent of an adult cannot be held to outweigh, in any given 
instance, an evidentially-supported finding that such a waiver 
was actually made."s 
Bair 
Failure to make much use of "own-recognizance releases" 
continues in some jurisdictions. Many inferior courts fail 
to use the procedure at all in Vehicle Code and other minor 
misdemeanor cases, despite a clear direction that they have 
. discretion to do SO.5 Similarly, use of own-recognizance 
releases in felony cases varies from county to county. Yet 
the various bail studies6 demonstrate that the use of this 
procedure has been successful with remarkably few excep-
tions. Failure to appear on a felony own-recognizance release 
is itself a felony, and on a misdemeanor release a misde-
meanor.7 I might add that these offenses should be very 
easy to prove. The California Supreme Court in In re 
Smiley8 nudged the courts in a mild way to make greater use 
1. 65 Cal.2d 719, 56 Cal. Rptr. 318, 
423 P.2d 246 (1967). 
2. 67 Cal.2d 367, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 
432 P.2d 202 (1967). 
3. 67 Cal.2d at 381, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 
596,432 P.2d at 212. 
. 4. See Note, An Alternative to the 
Bail System, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 643 
(1966). 
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5. Cal. Penal Code § 1318. 
6. See citations in In re Smiley, 66 
CaI.2d 606 at n. 3, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 
427 P.2d 179 (1967). 
7. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1319.4, 1319.6. 
8. 66 Cal. 2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 
427 P.2d 179 (1967). 
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of the own-recognizance release. Consider the problems of 
crowded and ancient jails, welfare costs for the families of 
those who cannot raise bail, loss of employment, and even 
equal protection of the laws. Perhaps it is time for more 
than a mild nudge. Doubtless the bail bond brokers' lobby 
will disagree. 
Preliminary Hearing 
The presenting of defenses in preliminary hearings is a 
troublesome problem. Anyone who has watched Perry Mason 
is aware of this. Perry seems invariably to win his case at 
the preliminary hearing. Or did he lose one once? Yet it 
is clear from Penal Code section 8669 that the defendant has 
a right to put on witnesses. 
Jennings v. Superior C ourtlO is practically a text on prelim-
inary hearings. In that case the defendant wanted to prove 
a defense of entrapment. He was unable to subpoena a key 
witness in his alleged defense and asked for a continuance. 
The magistrate concluded that the only issue was probable 
cause to hold the accused to answer, denied a continuance, 
and held the defendant to answer a charge of possession of 
narcotics. A motion under Penal Code section 995,11 on 
the ground of illegal commitment, was denied by the Superior 
Court. For this and other errors the court issued a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the trial, stating that the right of a 
defendant to reasonably prepare for trial is as fundamental 
9. Cal. Penal Code § 866. Examina-
tion of defendant's witnesses. 
When the examination of witnesses 
on the part of the people is closed, any 
witnesses the defendant may produce 
must be sworn and examined. 
10. 66 Cal.2d 867, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
440, 428 P.2d 304 (1967). 
11. Cal. Penal Code § 995. When 
indictment or information must be set 
aside. 
The indictment or information must 
be set aside by the court in which the 
defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, 
in either of the following cases: 
25 
If it be an indictment: 
1. Where it is not found, endorsed, 
and presented as prescribed in this code. 
2. That the defendant has been in-
dicted without reasonable or probable 
cause. 
If it be an information: 
1. That before the filing thereof the 
defendant had not been legally com-
mitted by a magistrate. 
2. That the defendant had been com-
mitted without reasonable or probable 
cause. 
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as the right to counsel, and the absence of a material witness 
for the defense, under appropriate conditions, is a ground for 
continuance. Justice McComb dissented without opinion. 
Ordinarily an attorney for a defendant will not want to put 
on his case at the preliminary hearing. However, he may want 
to pin down prosecution witnesses by cross-examination. He 
may even want to call some obviously prospective prosecution 
witnesses for discovery purposes. He will seldom call his own 
witnesses. Jennings should be no great burden on the courts 
-as long as we can keep out Perry Mason. 
Speedy Trial 
The legislature as well as the courts have had a great deal 
of trouble with the problem of the right to speedy trial in 
misdemeanor cases. At present, section 1382 of the Penal 
Code provides that the defendant must be brought to trial 
within thirty days after the arraignment if he is in custody, or 
within forty-five days after his arraignment if he is not. If 
he has no counsel, the court is supposed to explain his rights 
under this section. The section is very unfair. If an arrest 
is made for a misdemeanor not in the presence of the peace 
officer, a complaint is filed and a warrant issued. The busy 
sheriff's office may not get around to serving the warrant for 
months. The defendant may not even know that the peace 
officer intended to file a complaint. In fact, the peace officer 
probably did not know this until after he discussed the matter 
with his superiors. Section 1382 thus permits the trial of 
very stale misdemeanors. The case of In re Smiley12 provides 
a great deal of useful background on the problem. It also 
points to the importance of carefully advising the unrepre-
sented defendant of his rights under that section and making 
clear docket entries showing the details of the advice given. 
B. Retroactivity 
One of the most important developments in criminal proce-
dure is limitation on the retroactive effect of recent changes 
12. 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr, 579, 
427 P,2d 179 (1967), 
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in criminal procedure. The California Supreme Court wants 
to increase the rights of criminals, though there is at the 
same time some awareness of the problems of retroactivity. 
Twenty years ago, John Hood held up a Mom-and-Pop liquor 
store. He shot Pop in cold blood. Mom was the only eye-
witness. Now Mom is dead. Unfortunately, Hood was not 
accorded his then nonexistent due process rights. He was not 
informed of his then nonexistent right to remain silent and to 
counsel, including a right to counsel during any interrogation 
and while he was in a police lineup. He confessed. Under 
today's standards his confession would be inadmissible. If 
on habeas corpus we gave him a new trial, he would go free. 
We-or some of us-would hate to see John Hood go free, 
whether or not we agree with the new rules. Giving Supreme 
Court decisions prospective effect only is one way out. Once 
we turn to such a doctrine, the problem becomes to determine 
the date beyond which there will be no retroactivity. Should 
it be the date of the decision? Should it apply only to crimes 
which take place after the decision? What of pending ap-
peals? What of trials which have not yet taken place? 
One of the games the California Supreme Court plays is 
called "anticipating the United States Supreme Court." If 
we can beat that Court to some new extension of the Four-
teenth Amendment, we, rather than they, become the leaders. 
In Escobedo and Dorado, the United States Supreme Court 
and the California Supreme Court, respectively, developed 
new rules for questioning suspects. This was done under the 
guise of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of In re 
Lopez,13 the California court delivered one of its anticipatory 
decisions. It held that Escobedo and Dorado would apply 
only to judgments of conviction not final before June 22, 
1964, the date of Escobedo. In other words, Escobedo and 
Dorado would apply retroactively only to decisions still in 
the courts as of that date-cases which had not been tried or 
which were pending on appeal. They would not be applied to 
collateral attacks such as habeas corpus proceedings. This, 
13. 62 Cal.2d 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 
188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965). 
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of course, was a rather strange way to give a decision "pro-
spective effect." But as Alice said: "[H]ow curiously it 
twists! It's more like a corkscrew than a path!" 
The United States Supreme Court proceeded to disturb 
this result in Johnson v. New Jersey.14 The Court held that 
application of Escobedo and Miranda would be required only 
where the trial took place after the respective dates of those 
decisions. In a way, this is just as strange a doctrine of retro-
activity as that of California in Lopez. Logically, if we are 
going to apply such a doctrine, the key date should be the 
date of the event to which the new interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to be applied. Thus, logically, 
Escobedo should apply only to confessions which are procured 
after the date of that decision. In fact, logically, it should not 
even apply to Danny Escobedo's confession, although perhaps 
we can be kind and give Danny a break, since he was the 
guinea pig who started it all. 
So the California court found itself in a dilemma when 
faced with People v. Rollins/5 probably its most important 
decision of the year. Should it blushingly admit that it made 
a mistake in Lopez? Should it apply the Lopez rule to 
Miranda? Or should it take some compromise position, such 
as retaining Lopez for Escobedo and Dorado, and follow 
Johnson in Miranda-type decisions? The court chose to take 
the last-mentioned position. In a rather unconvincing opin-
ion, the court followed Johnson in limiting Miranda to trials 
which began after the date of that decision (June 13, 1966), 
but will continue to follow Lopez and apply Escobedo and 
Dorado to all cases not final before June 22, 1964, the date of 
Escobedo. What was it that Mr. Bumble said? "If the law 
supposes that . . . the law is a ass, a idiot." 
Justice Peters correctly pointed out that whatever rule 
California is to follow, it should be the same both with 
Escobedo and with Miranda. However, he preferred the 
Lopez rule. 
14. 384 u.s. 719, 16 L. Ed.2d 882, 15. 65 Ca1.2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966). 293,423 P.2d 221 (1967). 
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There were other important retroactivity decisions. In 
People v. lackson/6 the defendant testified at his pre-Escobedo 
penalty trial. Portions of the evidence, including seriously 
damaging statements which were admitted during his trial 
on the issue of guilt and during his first penalty trial, were 
admitted in evidence at his second penalty trial. The court 
held that Escobedo was applicable to the second penalty trial, 
which occurred after the magic date, June 22, 1964. Justice 
Peters dissented to a portion of the opinion which refused to 
apply Escobedo to the pre-Escobedo trial on issue of guilt. 
Justice McComb would have affirmed the death penalty. 
Douglas v. California17 created a right to counsel on appeal 
for indigent defendants. This right has been applied retro-
actively to cases prior to Douglas. In cases where appoint-
ment of counsel was denied, the appeal is reinstated and 
counsel appointed. However, the court in People v. Rivers18 
determined that Escobedo and Dorado would only apply to 
cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the Escobedo 
decision. Douglas created a retroactive right to counsel on 
appeal. But counsel appointed pursuant to Douglas could 
not raise an Escobedo problem. The court in Rivers stated: 
To apply Escobedo at a reinstated appeal and to review 
police conduct that occurred years before that decision 
would not promote equality. To the contrary, "the indi-
gent defendant deprived of counsel anomalously would 
find himself possessed of more shafts in his quiver than 
would have been the case had he been able to afford 
to properly arm himself in the first instance."19 
People v. Aranda20 established the notion that under most 
circumstances a defendant is entitled to a separate trial when 
his codefendant's confession is to be used at the trial. In 
16. 67 Cal.2d 91, 60 Cal. Rptr. 248, 18. 66 Cal.2d 1000, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
429 P.2d 600 (1967). For another out- 851, 429 P.2d 171 (1967). 
rageous application of the retroactivity 19. 66 Cal. 2d at 1004, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
doctrine in the Escobedo situation, see at 854, 429 P.2d at 174 (1967). 
People v. Powell., 67 Cal.2d 25, 59 20. 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 
Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137 (1967). 407 P.2d 265 (1965). 
17. 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed.2d 811, 
83 S. Ct. 814 (1963). 
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People v. Charles/ the California Supreme Court decided that 
the Aranda rule would be retroactive except as to cases where 
the attack was collateral. In other words, Aranda governs 
as to all cases still pending on direct review. This is so despite 
the fact that the court feels that Aranda is not constitutionally 
impelled but merely procedural. The court stubbornly ignores 
the more appropriate rule laid down in the Johnson decision. 
Justices Mosk, Burke, and McComb felt that Aranda should 
not govern cases tried before the decision was rendered in 
that case. Justice Mosk felt that Aranda was a rule of prac-
tice. Such a rule, if adopted by the legislature, would govern 
from the date it took effect. Why should there be a difference 
in a judicially created rule of practice? To apply it to cases 
prior to the decision, he said, "makes rare prescience a requi-
site in prosecutors and trial judges."2 One of the most amaz-
ing things about Charles is that the court applied Aranda 
although the case was tried before a trial judge without a 
jury on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Each de-
fendant confessed. Whatever the Aranda rule may be, it 
surely should not be applied in such circumstances. This is, 
to say the least, "anomalous," as is stated in the opinion of 
Justice Burke. I could use stronger language but will resist 
in this case, since I have plenty of support from the minority. 
C. Trial 
Present Insanity 
In Pate v. Robinson,S the United States Supreme Court 
held that where there is substantial evidence that a defendant 
is insane at the time of trial, there is a constitutional right 
to a hearing on that issue regardless of defendant's failure 
to demand a sanity hearing. The court's failure to make 
such an inquiry on its own motion is ground for reversal. 
The court stated, "[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defend-
ant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 
1. 66 Cal.2d 330, 57 Cal. Rptr. 745, 3. 383 U.S. 375, 15 L. Ed.2d 815, 86 
425 P.2d 545 (1967). S. Ct. 836 (1966). 
2. 66 Cal. 2d at 345, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
at 755,425 P.2d at 555 (1967). 
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'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to 
stand trial. "4 
What is "substantial evidence"? The California Supreme 
Court, in People v. Pennington,5 thought that the testimony 
of one psychologist who was neither an M.D. nor a Ph.D. 
sufficed to constitute substantial evidence. Although the 
psychologist had treated the defendant in the past, his testi-
mony was based on brief courtroom observations and a 
fifteen-minute interview. The trial judge had before him the 
reports of four psychiatrists, as well as his own observations 
of the defendant's actions in the courtroom. Two Justices 
dissented in an opinion by Justice Mosk. He pointed out the 
dissimilarity of Pate, since there the testimony of four wit-
nesses for the defense was uncontradicted. Shades of Mr. 
Bumble! 
People v. Laudermilk6 is inconsistent with Pennington. 
The defendant's own statements concerning psychiatric ex-
aminations in two Colorado hospitals, plus his attorney's 
statement to the effect that in his opinion defendant was 
incapable of assisting in his defense, were considered to be 
insufficient to require a hearing under Penal Code section 
1368.7 The psychiatric reports were apparently available 
to the four psychiatrists who examined defendant and were 
of the opinion he was competent to stand trial. Justice 
Peters vigorously dissented. Of course, Pennington was a 
capital case and Laudermilk was not. Perhaps this explains 
the rather obvious inconsistency between the two decisions. 
4. 383 U.S. at 384, 15 L. Ed.2d at 
821, 86 S. Ct. at 841 (1966). 
5. 66 Cal.2d 508, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 
426 P.2d 942 (1967). 
6. 67 Cal.2d 269, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 
431 P.2d 228 (1967). 
7. Cal. Penal Code § 1368. Ques-
tion of sauity to be submitted when 
doubt arises prior to judgmeut: Sus-
pension of proceedings: Discharge or 
retention of trial jury. 
If at any time during the pendency 
of an action and prior to judgment a 
doubt arises as to the sanity of the 
defendant, the court must order the 
question as to his sanity to be deter-
mined by a trial by the court without 
a jury, or with a jury, if a trial by 
jury is demanded; and, from the time 
of such order, all proceedings in the 
criminal prosecution shall be suspended 
until the question of the sanity of the 
defendant has been determined, and 
the trial jury in the criminal prosecu-
tion may be discharged, or retained, 
according to the discretion of the court 
until the determination of the issue of 
insanity. 
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Jury Trial 
In People v. Ray,S the defendant in a murder case (a life 
sentence for first-degree murder of his daughter) tried to avoid 
the application of Penal Code section 1074, subdivision 8. 
That subdivision, as interpreted in the decision, allows a chal-
lenge for implied bias in death penalty cases where a prospec-
tive juror does not believe in the death penalty. The defend-
ant's rather interesting contention was to the effect that such 
challenges should not be allowed as to the trial jury, but only 
to the penalty jury. In other words, he should be allowed two 
juries. One jury would try the issue of guilt and degree, and 
this jury could properly include jurors who oppose the death 
penalty. The other jury would try the issue of sentence, and 
jurors who opposed the death penalty could be challenged. 
The defendant presented the "evidence" of two psychologists 
to the effect that jurors who do not oppose the death sentence 
are more apt to convict than jurors who do. The evidence 
consisted of opinions based on general knowledge and experi-
ence without any research basis. The court rejected the 
defendant's contention. 
How does a borderline psychopath waive a jury trial? 
Apparently his lawyer cannot waive it for him. If he is 
really insane, he cannot intelligently waive his rights. The 
United States Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Overholser,9 estab-
lished the defendant's right, at least in the District of Colum-
bia, not to have the trial court or the prosecutor raise the 
insanity issue. This question was raised in People v. Look-
adoo.10 The court held that on the facts the defendant was 
competent to waive a jury trial. Suppose he was not? Lynch 
seems to leave this question open. Article I, section 7 of the 
California Constitution requires that a jury trial cannot be 
waived in criminal cases unless both defendant and his counsel 
concur. This provision has been very strictly construed.ll In 
8. 252 Cal. App.2d, 1002, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (1967). 
9. 369 U.S. 705, 8 L. Ed.2d 211, 82 
S. Ct. 1063 (1962). 
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608, 425 P.2d 208 (1967). 
11. See, e.g., People v. Holmes, 54 
Ca1.2d 442, 5 Cal. Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 
583 (1960). 
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People v. Hill,12 some doubt having arisen as to the defend-
ant's sanity at the time of trial, experts were appointed and 
a hearing held, after which he was found presently sane within 
the meaning of Penal Code section 1368. Apparently he 
was not informed of his right to a jury trial, either by court 
or by counsel. He claimed he had been denied his rights 
under Article I, section 7 of the state constitution. The court 
held that section 1368 requires a "special proceeding" col-
lateral to the criminal trial and that Article I, section 7 is 
inapplicable to such proceedings. The only right to a jury 
trial in such cases is that imposed by statute. The defendant 
was represented by counsel and there was no duty on the 
court to inform him of the right. 
Argument and Instruction 
In GrifJiin v. California/3 the Supreme Court of the United 
States overturned California's long-standing and earlier ap-
proved14 constitutional provision permitting comment on the 
failure of a defendant to testify. GrifJin was decided in 1965 
and, as might be expected, there were California decisions 
construing that decision this past year. 
In People v. Sudduth/5 the defendant was convicted of mis-
demeanor drunk driving. On his arrest he refused to take 
any of the physical tests, such as walking a straight line. He 
refused a Breathalyzer test. His refusal to take the tests was 
commented on by the prosecutor and the jury was instructed 
upon the significance of such refusal. The conviction was 
upheld in a unanimous opinion over self-incrimination con-
tentions. The court relied upon Schmerber v. California16 
and pointed to the need for fair and efficient detection and 
enforcement of the drunk driving laws in a day of excessive 
loss of life and property caused by inebriated drivers. 
12. 67 Cal.2d 100, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234, IS. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
429 P.2d 586 (1967). 393, 421 P.2d 401 (1966). 
13. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed.2d 106, 16. 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed.2d 908, 
85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965). 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966). 
14. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46,91 L. Ed. 1903,67 S. Ct. 1672, 171 
A.L.R. 1223 (1947). 
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In People v. Ellis/7 the defendant was charged with assault 
with intent to commit rape. He was asked by the police to 
repeat certain phrases to assist the victim in identifying him. 
The court, in a much less satisfactory and inconsistent opinion 
than Sudduth,18 held, over two dissents, that the prosecution's 
comment on defendant's failure to repeat the phrases was 
a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The 
court stated that, after giving the usual Fifth Amendment 
warning, "[DJefendant's refusal to speak might well have been 
the direct result of the police warning and cannot be used 
against him."19 Pity the poor peace officer. He is damned if 
he warns and damned if he doesn't. The opinion did suggest, 
however, that as a prerequisite to the use of the defendant's 
refusal to participate in a voice identification, the police must 
advise him that the right to remain silent does not include 
the right to refuse to participate in such a test. 
In People v. Ing,20 there was comment by the prosecutor 
and instructions by the trial judge after the defendant charged 
with rape took the witness stand but failed to testify concern-
ing other evidence of similar rapes, introduced to show a 
common scheme and design. Defendant's modus operandi 
was to drug girls who came to him for abortions and there-
after have sexual intercourse with them. The California Su-
preme Court distinguished Griffin.1 Here the defendant had 
testified. Considering the broad scope of permissible cross-
examination of a defendant who chooses to testify on his 
own behalf, the examination was proper. By taking the 
stand he waived any constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination with respect to the collateral offenses. 
Another application of Griffin occurred in People v. ROSS.2 
There, after an armed robbery and attempted murder with 
17. 65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 20. 65 Cal.2d 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 
421 P.2d 393 (1966). 422 P.2d 590 (1967). 
18. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 1. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed.2d 106, 
543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965). 
(1966). 2. 67 Cal.2d 58, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 
19. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d at 429 P.2d 606 (1967). 
539, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 421 P.2d 
at 398 (1966). 
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a shotgun with tape around it, the police were given a descrip-
tion of the escape vehicle and the robber. They attempted 
to stop a car answering the description. The driver imme-
diately accelerated. Shots were fired at the car and returned. 
The driver was ultimately apprehended after flight on foot. 
A sawed-off shotgun with white tape on the barrel was found 
100 feet from the car. The prosecutor commented and the 
court instructed on the failure of the accused to testify. The 
court thought that the statements were inconsequential under 
the facts. Chief Justice Traynor and Justice Peters dissented. 
In Garrity v. New Jersey,3 the United States Supreme Court 
was faced with the problem of whether incriminating state-
ments made by a government employee could be used against 
him in a criminal prosecution based on those statements. 
The court held that they could not be so used. The choice 
given him was either to forfeit his job or to pay the penalty 
of self-incrimination. One might ask why not, especially 
under the facts of the case. The defendants were police 
officers who allegedly were fixing traffic tickets. They were 
warned of their rights, but also told that they would be subject 
to removal if they refused to answer. This was another of 
the familiar five-to-four decisions. 
In People v. Genser,4 a California court of appeal was faced 
with a related problem. The defendant was charged with 
perjury for making false statements under oath in the course 
of an investigation of Department of Motor Vehicles person-
nel. The court of appeal showed good judgment in distin-
guishing Garrity and affirming the conviction. It felt that 
Garrity did not furnish a license to commit perjury. 
Death Penalty Trial 
The court continues to narrow in on death penalty cases. 
If one carefully scans the reports, he may have a feeling that 
it does little else. It is rumored that there are clerks who 
do nothing but look for possibilities of reversing death penal-
3. 385 u.s. 493, 17 L. Ed.2d 562, 87 4. 250 Cal. App.2d 351, 58 Ca1. 
S. Ct. 616 (1967). Rptr. 290 (1967). 
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ties. Consider, for example, People v. Bandhauer.5 There 
the court, using one of its common ploys, scanned the prose-
cutor's argument and found what it thought were objection-
able remarks, although no objection had been made. Then 
it went on by way of dictum to overrule numerous decisions, 
some of which had resulted in executions. No longer will 
the prosecutor have the closing argument in a proceeding to 
determine sentence for murder under Penal Code section 
190.1. Mr. Bumble could star on nearly every page of this 
article. Meanwhile, the public defenders continue to exhaust 
their meager budgets on death penalty cases. They complain, 
usually privately, that they don't have enough left to do a 
proper job on their other cases. 
And then there was People v. Griffin. 6 
Yes, this is the Griffin who was able to persuade the 
Supreme Court of the United States that the long-standing 
provision of the California Constitution allowing comment 
on the failure of the defendant to take the stand should be 
held invalid.7 This year the results of his third trial arrived 
at the California Supreme Court. As might be expected, the 
court found a technical ground on which to reverse his death 
penalty conviction. Evidence was admitted concerning an 
attempted rape in Mexico, a charge on which the defendant 
had been acquitted. Evidence of the acquittal was excluded. 
This minor error was held to be prejudicial and the conviction 
was reversed. Justices Burke and McComb dissented. Hope-
fully the prosecutor will try again. Meanwhile "waiting jus-
tice sleeps," as does Griffin's victim of seven years ago. 
The California Supreme Court again upheld the separate 
proceeding to determine sentence for murder provided for in 
Penal Code section 190.1. It again rejected the contention 
that the section is unconstitutional because no guidelines are 
specified to assist the jury in determining whether the penalty 
should be death or life imprisonment.8 One may doubt that 
5. 66 Cal.2d 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332, 7. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
426 P.2d 900 (1967). 14 L. Ed.2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965). 
6. 66 Cal.2d 459, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107, 8. People v. Seiterle, 65 Ca1.2d 333, 
426 P.2d 507 (1967). 54 Cal. Rptr. 745, 420 P.2d 217 (1966). 
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arty guidelines would have helped this defendant who appar-
ently unnecessarily strangled a husband and wife in the course 
of a $200 robbery. This is defendant Seiterle's fourth appear-
ance before the court.9 What a waste of judicial effort on 
an admitted first-degree murder. Can there be no finality in 
a California death penalty case? Seiterle's victims were mur-
dered nearly eight years ago-quite finally. 
Evidence, to be admissible in the Penal Code section 190.1 
proceeding to determine whether capital punishment should 
be assessed, must meet the standards of Penal Code section 
1111 (the corroboration-of-accomplice section). In other 
words, other robberies cannot be proven as aggravating cir-
cumstances by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice 
in those robberies. 9a Another death penalty goes back for 
retrial. 
D. Post-Trial Proceedings 
Motions after Trial 
Sections 1118,1° 1118.111 and 1118.212 have been added to 
the Penal Code to provide that the defendant can move for 
a judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rests or at the 
close of the evidence. The court can also acquit on its own 
motion. Acquittal is a bar to further prosecution. The 
former anomalous provision for an advised verdict is replaced 
by the new procedure. 
Sentencing 
The Health and Safety Code, under certain of the narcotics 
sections, requires denial of probation to a second-felony of-
fender. The defendant in In re Sanchez13 was convicted the 
first time of possession of certain narcotics at a time when 
9. People v. Seiterle, 56 Cal. 2d 320, 
14 Cal. Rptr. 681, 363 P.2d 913 (1961); 
59 Cal.2d 703, 31 Cal. Rptr. 67, 381 
P.2d 947 (1963); In re Seiterle, 61 Cal. 
2d 651, 39 Cal. Rptr. 716, 394 P.2d 
556 (1964). 
9a. People v. Varnum, 66 Cal.2d 
808, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772 
(1967). 
10. Judgment of acquittal: Nonjury 
case. 
11. Same: Jury case. 
12. Same: Appealability of judg-
ment. 
13. 65 Cal.2d 556, 55 Cal. Rptr. 422, 
421 P.2d 430 (1966). 
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the offense could be either a felony or a misdemeanor in 
the discretion of the court. However, no "sentence" was ever 
imposed, since he was committed to the Youth Authority. 
The Supreme Court held that, under the statutes, as it then 
interpreted them, the trial judge had no alternative but to 
commit the defendant to a state prison upon his second 
conviction. 
The problem of double punishment under Penal Code sec-
tion 654 continued to be troublesome. That section provides 
that an act punishable under different provisions of the Penal 
Code can only be punished under one of those provisions. It 
is worded in terms of double jeopardy and should not require 
reversal of a judgment where concurrent sentences are imposed 
for the same act. However, the court rejected this notion 
in Neal v. California,14 and the resulting morass of litigation 
has caused much trouble. 
In the case of In re Wright/5 the Supreme Court made 
it quite clear that no longer can concurrent sentences violating 
Penal Code section 654 be upheld as working no prejudice. 
A number of court of appeal decisions to the contrary were 
disapproved. A suggestion by the Attorney General that one 
sentence be suspended was rejected. 
Where defendant kidnaps A, B, and C for the purposes of 
robbery, and also steals a safe, he can be convicted of three 
kidnappings and the robbery. However, the concurrent bur-
glary sentence could not be sustained. The court "directed" 
the Adult Authority "to exclude the burglary sentence from 
its consideration. "16 
Another such case, In re McGrew/7 involved a burglary 
after which the defendant raped the victim three times and 
forced her into an act of oral copulation. He was convicted 
on two counts of rape, one count under section 288 of 
the Penal Code, and the burglary. The California Supreme 
Court noted that on his entry he had told the victim he was 
14. 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 16. In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d at 184, 
357 P.2d 839 (1960). 57 Cal. Rptr. at 129, 424 P.2d at 681 
15. 65 Cal.2d 650, 56 Cal. Rptr. (1967). 
110,422 P.2d 998 (1967). 17. 66 Cal.2d 685, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
561, 427 P.2d 161 (1967). 
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going to "have her in every way possible."18 It held that 
under section 654 only the burglary conviction could stand. 
Or consider the rather ridiculous decision in In re lohnson/9 
where the court held that two sales of heroin to one customer, 
one at 9:00 p.m. and one at 11 :00 p.m., constituted one act. 
The court calls it a "single transaction." But section 654 
speaks only in terms of the "same act," not transactions, 
and the court extends this to what it recognizes as a "series 
of acts."20 
Of course, all of the facts are before the Adult Authority 
anyway when it fixes the sentences. Isn't the court dreaming 
when it "orders" the Authority to ignore an assault with a 
deadly weapon on A (shooting and pistol whipping) in the 
course of an armed robbery of B?l The Authority is going 
to determine the sentence on the basis of the facts in the file. 
Would it not be remiss in its statutory duties if it failed to con-
sider such facts as more serious than a less complicated armed 
robbery where only one victim is involved? Perhaps the 
defendant in Neal may not be adjudged guilty of both arson 
and attempted murder when he throws gasoline into an occu-
pied bedroom and ignites it. Surely the Adult Authority 
is going to consider the heinousness of the facts surrounding 
the crime in determining sentence. One hopes that the Adult 
Authority is adult enough to ignore this attempt of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to interfere with its prerogatives. Surely 
there should be something left of the doctrine of separation 
of powers. 
Perhaps the most pleasant aspect of the Neal problem is 
that the court is basing the decision on a statute. So far it 
is not based on constitutional law. The legislature still can 
correct this judicial meandering. 
Appeal 
Where a defendant is convicted of three offenses and given 
concurrent sentences, can he be retried and given consecutive 
18. 66 Cal.2d at 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 20. 65 Cal.2d at 394-395, 54 Cal. 
at 562, 427 P.2d at 162 (1967). Rptr. at 874, 420 P.2d at 394 (1966). 
19. 65 Ca1.2d 393, 54 Cal. Rptr. 1. In re Henry, 65 Cal.2d 330, 54 
873, 420 P.2d 393 (1966). Cal. Rptr. 633, 420 P.2d 97 (1966). 
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sentences if the conviction is reversed? This apparently novel 
question was posed in People v. Ali.2 The court answered 
it in the negative, modifying the judgment to make the sen-
tences run concurrently. The court analogized its facts with 
those in People v. Henderson. 3 In that case the court held 
that a defendant who is given a life sentence is not required 
to risk his life when he appeals what turns out to have been 
an erroneous judgment. Both decisions seem clearly correct. 
Where an information is dismissed by the court in a Penal 
Code section 995 motion, the people can appeal.4 Can they 
simultaneously file a new indictment or information? In 
Anderson v. Superior Court,5 the court was faced with a con-
tention that this practice was unfair to the defendant, since 
he would have to defend the appeal on the first information 
and simultaneously prepare for trial on the second pleading. 
The court took a middle ground. The prosecutor can take 
both courses. However, he must elect between them as soon 
as feasible. This election should be no later than the time 
when the new pleading withstands a section 995 motion or 
at the time of arraignment under it, whichever first occurs. 
Parole 
In the case of In re Schoengarth,6 the defendant asked if 
he could be sent to Colorado to be tried under charges out-
standing there. The Adult Authority fixed his sentence at 
below the maximum on the condition that he go to Colorado 
to stand trial. He then refused to accept the condition. The 
Authority then reinstated his indeterminate sentence. The 
California Supreme Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Authority in fixing and redetermining indeterminate 
sentences. Defendant's refusal to accept the condition of 
parole constituted cause to refix his sentence. 
2. 66 Cal.2d 277, 57 Cal. Rptr. 348, 5. 66 Cal.2d 863, 59 Cal. Rptr. 426, 
424 P.2d 932 (1967). 428 P.2d 290 (1967). 
3. 60 Cal.2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 6. 66 Cal.2d 295, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 
386 P.2d 677 (1963). 425 P.2d 200 (1967). 
4. See Cal. Penal Code § 1238. 
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Habeas Corpus 
Is habeas corpus available to a defendant at large under 
his own recognizance? The California Supreme Court was 
faced with this issue in In re SmiZey.7 Smiley applied to the 
California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
grounds, principally, that he had not been advised of his 
right to counselor his right to a speedy trial. He was 
released on his own recognizance by the court pending final 
disposition. The Superior Court of Imperial County, at a 
later hearing, denied habeas corpus and remanded defendant 
to the custody of the sheriff. Defendant then applied for 
habeas corpus to the Federal District Court, which ordered 
him released on his own recognizance pending hearing on 
the merits. The Federal District Court later ruled that the 
defendant had not exhausted his state remedies, and denied 
his application, but ordered that the defendant remain at lib-
erty on his own recognizance pending rehearing by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. 
Justice Mosk, in a very informative opinion, stated that 
it is settled that the use of habeas corpus has not been 
restricted to situations in which the applicant is in actual 
physical custody. 
II. Criminal Law 
Major crimes in California rose 8.7 percent in 1966 as 
compared with 1965. During the same period the popula-
tion increased 1.7 percent. Crime is increasing more than 
five times as fast as the population. The rate of major crimes 
during the same period rose from 2643.5 to 2825.7 per 
100,000 persons. If the same rate of increase continues, 
we can predict that the 1967 report will show one serious 
crime for every 33 persons, including infants.s 
Crime, whether on or off the streets, is the result of many 
things. It has been my contention that one, if not the primary, 
cause lies with the supreme courtS.9 In their efforts to protect 
7. 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 
427 P.2d 179 (1967). 
8. These figures are based on FBI, 
Uniform Crime Reports-1966, p. 64. 
26 
9. See, e.g., address, Are the Courts 
Creating the Crime Problem?, Com-
monwealth Club of California, July 16, 
1965. 
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criminals they too often overlook the needs of the public and 
its police. As has been seen, our California Supreme Court 
has even developed a reputation of trying to anticipate the 
United States Supreme Court. 
What are some of the possible solutions to the problem? 
One obviously is less tender loving care for the criminals. 
More and more the police are being handcuffed. Our Su-
preme Court is somewhat handicapped because it is often 
bound by United States Supreme Court decisions. But it 
could use some restraint-if it wanted to. Another possible 
solution might be to create a court of criminal appeal com-
posed of experienced trial lawyers. Such a court has been 
quite successful in England. Furthermore, this would give 
the obviously overworked California Supreme Court more 
time for civil cases. Alternately, we might limit its jurisdic-
tion by requiring certification by the California Court of 
Appeal before a case goes to the California Supreme Court, 
perhaps allowing that court to take a case on its own motion 
on the basis of a reported California Court of Appeal opinion. 
The Supreme Court should not be required to hear stale 
and meaningless habeas corpus cases which can be left to 
the lower courts of appeal. An example is the multiple pun-
ishment problem, where the court spends countless hours 
reviewing ancient claims based on records which will still 
be considered by the Adult Authority despite directions to 
the contrary from the California Supreme Court, and rightly 
so. 
lt would also be helpful if our Governor and President 
showed concern for crime on the streets in their judicial 
appointments, particularly to the supreme courts. One hopes 
that Governor Reagan's and the President's future appoint-
ments show such concern. 
Diminished Responsibility 
The California doctrine of diminished responsibility con-
tinues to be increased in application. There seems to be a 
growing tendency on the part of the California Supreme Court 
in considering whether there is diminished responsibility to 
402 CAL LAW 1967 
36
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 16
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/16
Criminal Law and Procedure 
examine the personal turpitude of the defendant. In its 
previous consideration of this doctrine, in People v. Wolfj,lO 
the court felt that the defendant had ample time to deliberate 
and premeditate. It felt that he knew the difference between 
right and wrong. However, it also felt that his ability to 
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to appraise 
his moral turpitude was vague and detached. Citing People 
v. Holt,11 the court emphasized the importance of the turpi-
tude of the offender as a distinguishing factor between first 
and second-degree murder. 
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court, citing Wolfj, 
again reduced convictions of first-degree murder to second-
degree murder. Thus in People v. Goedecke/2 where the 
defendant was found guilty of the first-degree murder of his 
father, and not guilty by reason of insanity of the murders 
of his mother, brother, and sister, the conviction was reduced 
to second-degree murder, despite ample evidence that the 
crime was studiously planned and executed and conflicting 
evidence by experts that his mental capacity was diminished. 
As in W olfj, the court found that although the defendant knew 
the difference between right and wrong and that the intended 
act was wrong, the extent of his understanding, his reflection 
on it and its consequences, with realization of the enormity 
of the evil, was materially vague and detached and fell short 
of the minimum requirements of first-degree murder, espe-
cially with respect to the quantum of reflection, comprehen-
sion, and turpitude of the offender. 
In People v. Nicolaus,t3 the defendant murdered his three 
children and was found guilty of first-degree murder. Once 
again there were defense psychiatrists willing to testify that 
his responsibility was diminished. Others testified to the con-
trary. In both cases, the court, with two dissenting Justices, 
reduced the degree of the crime to second-degree murder. 
Justice Burke, writing for the majority in Goedecke, took 
pains to emphasize the "turpitude of the offender" language 
10. 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 12. 65 Cal.2d 850, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
394 P.2d 959 (1964). 625, 423 P.2d 777 (1967). 
11. 25 Cal.2d 59, 153 P.2d 21 (1944). 13. 65 Cal.2d 866, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
635, 423 P.2d 787 (1967). 
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of WolfJ. He said: "[T]he controlling issue as to degree 
depends not alone on the character of the killing but also 
on the question of personal turpitude of the actor.,,14 Justice 
Mosk, McComb concurring, wrote a strong and well-reasoned 
dissent in both Goedecke and Nicolaus. One may disagree 
with the application of the "personal turpitude" measure to 
the facts. However, perhaps one can agree that this is a 
much more logical distinction between first and second-degree 
murder than is the present terminology "wilful, deliberate, 
and premeditated." 
The court seemingly has no statutory method available to 
it to change a death penalty to life imprisonment in the case 
of first-degree murder. Penal Code section 126015 would 
seem to allow modification of the sentence, but the court 
has reached the contrary result in several decisions.16 In 
theory at least, the death penalty and life imprisonment are 
equivalents. Section 1181 ( 6) 17 allows reduction of degree 
where the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of 
that degree. The court has refused to reduce the degree 
in first-degree murder cases unless the evidence, insufficient 
to show first-degree murder, did show second-degree murder. IS 
I am not alone in finding the diminished responsibility 
doctrine perplexing.19 Perhaps what the court is doing is 
finding a method of circumventing sections 1181 (6) and 
14. 65 Cal.2d at 857, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
at 630, 423 P.2d at 782. 
15. Cal. Penal Code § 1260. Deter-
mination of appeal. 
The court may reverse, affirm, or 
modify a judgment or order appealed 
from, or reduce the degree of the 
offense or the punishment imposed, 
and may set aside, affirm, or modify 
any or all of the proceedings subsequent 
to, or dependent upon, such judgment 
or order, and may, if proper, order a 
new trial. 
16. See People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 
200, 213, 266 P.2d 505, 512 (1954) and 
cases therein cited. 
17. Cal. Penal Code § 1181(6) pro-
vides that when a verdict has been 
404 CAL LAW 1967 
rendered or a finding made against a 
defendant, the court may grant a new 
trial when "the verdict or finding is 
contrary to law or evidence, but if the 
evidence shows the defendant to be 
not guilty of the degree of the crime 
of which he was convicted, but guilty 
of a lesser degree thereof, or of a 
lesser crime included therein, the court 
may modify the verdict, finding or 
judgment accordingly without granting 
or ordering a new trial, and this power 
shall extend to any court to which 
the cause may be appealed; . . ." 
18. Cf. People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 
164, 163 P.2d 8 (1945). 
19. See, e.g., People v Hoxie, 252 Cal. 
App.2d 967, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967). 
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1260. It is rather obvious from its actions that the majority 
of the court opposes the death penalty. One way or another 
it has prevented executions since January 1963, with one 
exception. The court has accomplished what the legislature 
refused to do. It has placed a moratorium on capital punish-
ment, except for one scapegoat. 20 
The court is very ingenious in its efforts to circumvent 
executions as required by law of California. Its decisions 
are subject to sudden about-faces. Precedents mean nothing. 
One deputy district attorney said not long ago: "We are 
supposed to play by the rules of the game. The trouble is 
that they change the rules after the game is over." Consider, 
for example, People v. Morse. l Morse involved the practice 
of permitting the prosecutor to comment on and the court 
to instruct on the fact that life imprisonment does not mean 
life imprisonment, since there is eligibility for parole, often 
in seven years. This practice dates back to at least 1931. 
Numerous persons have been executed where there was com-
ment and instruction on the possibility of parole. Isn't it 
obvious that a jury has a right to know about the possibility 
of parole and consider this in determining whether or not to 
give a death penalty? The Adult Authority is far from 
infallible. However, the court in Morse, groping for ways 
to cut down or postpone death penalties, chose to overrule 
this longtime practice. This, of course, is a head-in-the-sand 
approach. Surely at least one member of every jury knows 
of the possibility of parole and will communicate it to his 
fellows. But changing the practice is a device to postpone 
executions. 
For many years the court has insisted that the jury must 
have absolute discretion in its death penalty decision. It has 
made cop.tinuous efforts to contain the People's argument 
for the death penalty. Perhaps we are now due for another 
about-face. Perhaps the court will soon say that Penal Code 
section 190.1 is unconstitutional since it provides the jury 
with no standards. This would not be unexpected. The court 
20. Cf. Leviticus XVI. 1. 60 Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 
388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810 (1964). 
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may even put on its blinders and declare that the death penalty 
is a cruel and unusual punishment, ignoring the fact that 
capital punishment is obviously within the contemplation of 
both the Federal and State Constitutions. Both provide for 
the deprivation of life with due process of law.2 
Intoxication 
A defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon3 
is entitled to a jury instruction on simple assault under Penal 
Code section 240 if he claims he was too drunk to know that 
uniformed officers in a patrol car were peace officers. In 
People v. Garcia,4 the defendant, on being questioned by 
uniformed police officers, was unable to identify himself, and 
appeared to be intoxicated. The officers decided to arrest 
him, but the defendant broke away. Defendant found a stick 
and struck the officers, finally being subdued after a struggle. 
He later testified he was too drunk to recognize the officers 
and had assumed the patrol wagon to be a truck. The court 
found that when a defendant is on trial for assault with a 
deadly weapon, if there is evidence to justify a charge of simple 
assault, an instruction on the latter is mandatory, at least 
where the defendant requests such an instruction. The court 
recognized that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a 
crime, but stated that the jury may consider the fact of intoxi-
cation whenever the actual existence of a particular purpose, 
motive, or intent is a necessary element.5 
Mistake 
The California Supreme Court, in a five-to-two decision in 
People v. Butler,6 reaffirmed the doctrine7 that claim of right 
2. See, e.g., People v. Bandhauer, 
66 Cal.2d 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332, 426 
P.2d 900 (1967), where the court selects 
a few isolated remarks of the prosecutor 
and finds reversible error, and then 
goes on to render a gratuitous dictum 
to the effect that the prosecutor can no 
longer have a right to close in a Penal 
Code § 190.1 proceeding. 
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3. See Cal. Penal Code § 245(b). 
4. 250 Cal. App.2d 15, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
186 (1967). 
5. See Cal. Penal Code § 22. 
6. 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 
421 P.2d 703 (1967). 
7. See People v. Rosen, 11 Cal.2d 
147, 78 P.2d 727, 116 A.L.R. 991 
(1938). 
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is a defense to a charge of armed robbery, even where the 
robbery results in a homicide. The defendant claimed he only 
intended to collect money due him for wages and that his 
gun went off accidentally. The prosecutor was permitted, 
over objection, to argue that it is still robbery even if one's 
intention is only to recover money he claims to be owed him. 
The majority expressed the view that the defendant's objection 
was well taken, reasoning that robbery requires that the taking 
be felonious and thus a bona fide belief of the defendant, even 
if mistaken, that he had the right to the property is a valid 
defense since it negates the felonious intent. Justice Mosk, 
dissenting, felt that in "a bucolic western scene or in the 
woolly atmosphere of the frontier in the nineteenth century, 
the six-shooter may have been an acceptable device for do-it-
yourself debt collection," but that "a might-makes-right doc-
trine is of dubious adaptability to urban society 
in this final third of the twentieth century."s He quite prop-
erly pointed out that Penal Code section 211, on robbery 
upon which the felony-murder prosecution was based, raises 
no issue of ownership of the property taken. It requires only 
that it be taken forcibly from the "possession" of another. 
Justice McComb concurred. Both dissenters also felt that 
there was no prejudicial error, and certainly none was shown 
by the facts as stated in the majority opinion. However, 
the majority felt that there was prejudicial error per se because 
the prosecutor's argument deprived the defendant of his right 
to have all "significant" issues determined by a jury. 
Homicide 
Can a parent be convicted of manslaughter for failing to 
obtain medical assistance when needed by a child? In People 
v. Arnold,9 the defendant belonged to the Church of the First 
Born,. which believes in faith healing. Her daughter was 
painfully ill over a number of days as the result of a blocked 
small intestine. The medical evidence was to the effect that 
she could have been saved until very close to the time she 
8. 65 CaI.2d at 577, 55 Cal. Rptr. 9. 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 
at 517, 421 P.2d at 709. 426 P.2d 515 (1967). 
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died. The theory of the prosecution was that a conviction 
could be obtained if defendant violated Penal Code section 
270 (omission to furnish necessary medical assistance) or 
section 272 (failure to provide necessities), if the defendant 
knew or "should have known" of the danger of death. Al-
though the court reversed on procedural grounds, in no way 
did it object to the theory of the prosecution's case. The 
question of culpability of a person who believes in faith heal-
ing is a very fascinating philosophical problem.10 Such a 
person is negligent if a reasonable person would not have 
held such a belief. But one may question whether such a 
person is culpable and whether the purposes of the criminal 
law are served by confining her to the county jail for one 
year. For that matter, one may raise the question whether 
any person should be punished for negligent homicide. In 
this case, without convicting her of manslaughter, she could 
easily be convicted of violations of Penal Code section 270 
or 272 and still be sent to the county jail for one year. Per-
haps the latter procedure is more rational. 
Assault 
In People v. Hoxie/ 1 the court of appeal held that an 
assault with intent to commit murder could be an assault 
with "intent" to commit second-degree murder. However, 
it seemingly limited this doctrine to murders involving an 
intent to kill. One defense was diminished responsibility. 
The court was troubled by the distinctions drawn between first 
and second-degree murder by the California Supreme Court. 
(Aren't we all?) However, it held that even here, absent 
evidence of diminished responsibility, the defendant could 
have been found guilty of second-degree murder had the 
assault been successful. The conviction was affirmed. 
10. See, e.g., Trescher and O'Neill, 11. 252 Cal. App.2d 967, 61 Cal. 
Medical Care for Dependent Children: Rptr. 37 0967). 
Manslaughter Liability of the Christian 
Scientist, 109 PA. L. REV. 203 (1960). 
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Conspiracy 
Penal Code section 182 (5) makes it a crime to conspire 
to "commit any act injurious to the public health, to public 
morals, or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due admin-
istration of the laws." One may question the need for this 
provision since the cases, except possibly for the obstruction 
of justice portion, seem invariably to include the commission 
of or conspiracy to commit crimes. In People v. Rehman,12 
the constitutionality of the provision was questioned on the 
"void for vagueness" doctrine. The essence of the charge 
was conspiracy to practice medicine without a license-
including such things as surgery, delivering babies, and sim-
ilar matters. Judge Kincaid, a retired California Superior 
Court judge sitting pro tempore, wrote a very fine opinion 
upholding the constitutionality of the statute. 
Obstructing an Officer 
The defendant in People v. COOkS18 was charged with a 
violation of Penal Code section 148, obstructing an officer 
in the discharge of his duties. The officer was trying to 
question a robbery suspect in a bar. The defendant bartender 
repeatedly told the suspect not to answer any questions and 
not to show identification. The suspect followed defendant's 
advice despite the officer's repeated verbal attempts to quiet 
the defendant. The trial court, at the close of the evidence, 
dismissed the charge on the ground that the facts showed 
constitutionally protected speech. The State successfully 
appealed. The Appellate Department of the San Diego 
Superior Court said that the defendant had deliberately set 
out to obstruct a police officer and had succeeded in his 
purpose, and that such speech-conduct is not constitutionally 
protected. 
12. 253 Cal. App.2d 117, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 65 (1967). 
13. 250 Cal. App.2d -, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 550 (case subsequently transferred 
to Court of Appeals and certified for 
nonpublication July 13, 1967). 
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Perjury 
In People v. Walker,14 the defendant, an aluminum siding 
contractor, was convicted of perjury growing out of sworn 
statements before a notary. He would swear before the notary 
that he had witnessed signatures when in fact he had not. The 
conviction was affirmed. It is a well-known fact that many 
notaries are rather lax about formalities. All of us have 
experienced such laxity. What the solution is, I am not sure. 
One possibility might be to do away with notaries. 
Trespass; Disorderly Conduct 
In People v. Wilkinson/5 four persons went through a fence 
onto private property without consent and made their way 
to a beach. There they improvised a tarp campsite complete 
with sleeping bags and fire over which they were preparing 
their breakfast when arrested. They were convicted of a 
violation of Penal Code section 602 (1), which makes "enter-
ing and occupying" real property without the consent of the 
owner a misdemeanor. The court reversed, holding that 
the section applies only to nontransient continuous occupa-
tion. It suggested that section 602.5 would not apply either, 
since no structure was employed. Perhaps it was because of 
this decision and the hippie invasion generally that Penal Code 
section 647(h) was adopted in 1967. That subsection makes 
it disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, to lodge in "any build-
ing, structure or place, whether public or private" without 
permission. 
Abortion16 
The legislature enacted a so-called Therapeutic Abortion 
Act/7 which became effective November 8, 1967, after the 
period covered by this article. The Act permits a physician 
to perform an abortion in a hospital when approved by a 
14. 247 Cal. App.2d 554, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 726 (1967), cert. denied - U.S. 
-, 19 L. Ed.2d '77, 88 S. Ct. 60 
(1967). 
15. 248 Cal. App.2d Supp. 906, 56 
Cal. Rptr. 261 (1967). 
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16. See Leavy, California's New 
Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Anal-
ysis and Guide to Medical and Legal 
Procedure, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1967). 
17. Cal. Health & Safety Code § § 
25950-25954. 
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hospital committee if there is a risk to the physical or mental 
health of the mother, or if the pregnancy resulted from rape 
or incest. Provisions are made for prosecutor opinions and 
court hearings on the matter of rape or incest. Statutory 
rape is excluded from the definition of rape, unless the girl 
is under the age of fifteen. 
Penal Code section 274 is unchanged. Thus, a physician 
still has a defense that the abortion was necessary to preserve 
life. One may doubt that the Act is more than a token 
approach to the problem, which involves healthy women, 
married or unmarried, who want abortions, as well as victims 
of rapes and incest. They still may be forced to go to the 
Tijuana butchers. One may predict that the law will be 
stretched to take care of some of their problems. IS It will 
be interesting to see how it works in practice. 
Indecent Exposure 
People v. Merriam I9 is worthy of note largely because of a 
very brave victim, a Mrs. Alyce Wolf. She discovered the 
defendant exposing himself in a basement storeroom and 
ordered him to leave. When he would not, she attempted to 
move him by force. She finally succeeded after calling 
police, who arrived shortly after his departure. 
There is also a point of law in the Merriam decision. Al-
though indecent exposure is not like some sex crimes where 
fabrication is a danger, the shocking nature of the acts might 
lead to hasty identification. Therefore a cautionary instruc-
tion must be given to the effect that in prosecutions for sex 
offenses, including indecent exposure, accusations are easy 
to make and difficult to prove. The jury should be told that 
the testimony of complaining witnesses should be viewed with 
caution. Failure to give such an instruction, whether re-
quested or not, is error. 
18. Doubtless the word will get 
around that a woman who can con-
vince her physician or psychiatrist that 
she contemplates suicide can obtain a 
therapeutic abortion. Of course, if 
she can't afford a physician or psychia-
trist, she can go ahead and have her 
unwanted baby. 
19. 66 Cal.2d 390, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
426 P.2d 161 (1967). 
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Fortunately, in Merriam the evidence was solid. The 
identification by Mrs. Wolf was quite positive. The court for 
once applied Article VI, section 13 and held that the error 
was harmless. 
Bravo Mrs. Wolf! God Bless You. 
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